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A Case for Autonomy: an Examination into an Adolescent’s Right to Refuse Treatment 
 
Imagine being a fourteen year old sitting inside your doctor’s office in a large hospital. 
The hospital is one you know very well.  Having been diagnosed with cancer at the age of five, 
you have been in and out of this hospital for almost ten years.  But for the past year you have 
been in remission. Now imagine your doctor comes to tell you the cancer is back and worse than 
ever. Your parents are crying as the doctor explains that you can start chemotherapy again. With 
chemotherapy, you could gain six months to a year in life expectancy, if you’re lucky two years. 
But you will spend that time undergoing chemotherapy in and out of the hospital and dealing 
with all of the side effects. If you were an adult, you could weigh whether or not you wanted 
treatment. But you are not an adult. At fourteen, you sit there and your parents make the final 
decision.  While the doctors and your parents will probably discuss your options with you, and a 
doctor will probably not force treatment on you, at fourteen, you have no legal right to refuse 
treatment. Instead of making an informed decision, you may end up in a court room with a judge 
making the ultimate decision for you. 
This story is one that happens across the United States. This paper seeks to explore what 
should happen in a scenario such as the one above. The decision whether to discontinue life-
sustaining treatment
1
 is one of the most important decisions an individual can make.
2
 A 
                                                          
1
 For the purposes of this paper life sustaining treatment is defined as medical treatment that would prevent or 
forestall the patient’s death. It can include treatment to prevent death where the risk is imminent such as a respirator 
2 
 
competent adult has the right to refuse treatment.  For a competent adult, it is a decision that can 
be made independently. When the patient receiving life-sustaining treatment is a minor, 
however, that decision rests with the child’s parents or guardian, or in some cases, the state itself. 
The minor patient does not, for the most part, have the ability to consent to medical treatment or 
the cessation of medical treatment. Thus, the all-important decision on whether to continue life 
sustaining treatment is removed from the person it most affects, the patient.   
This paper examines the current legal climate regarding competency and capability of an 
adolescent minor
3
 to consent to or refuse medical treatment. The paper further weighs the 
potentially conflicting interests among the minor, the parent and the state and then analyzes the 
ethical and moral issues that those conflicting interests create. Finally, this paper argues that the 
legislature should adopt a rebuttable presumption that an adolescent minor is competent and 
capable of deciding to consent to or refuse medical treatment.  
  Part II of this paper will examine the current law regarding the competency and 
capabilities of adolescent minors to consent to treatment. It will further compare the consent laws 
for minors across different medical fields and treatments. Finally this section will examine the 
mature minor exceptions which exist in American jurisprudence and how those exceptions take 
the interests of minors into consideration.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
or cardio pulmonary resuscitation. It can also include treatment to prevent death where the risk is less imminent such 
as chemotherapy or bone marrow transplants. The analysis and discussion in this paper are confined to a minor’s 
right to terminate or refuse life sustaining treatment. The paper will not deal with a minor’s right, or lack of right 
physician assisted suicide, and voluntary active euthanasia.  
2
 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 837 (9
th
 Cir. 1996) (stating that no decision is as painful or 
important than how and when one's life should end).  
3
 An adolescent minor is defined as an individual aged thirteen to eighteen. See generally Thomas Grisso & Linda 
Vierling, Minors’ Consent to Treatment: a Developmental Perspective, PROF. PSYCHO. 412 (1978). 
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Part III of this paper will weigh the conflicting interests of a minor in the ability to 
consent or refuse treatment, the interests of their parents and the interests of the state and will 
analyze the problems created when those interests conflict. 
Part IV will examine the cognitive abilities of a minor to consent to or refuse treatment. 
This section will examine several psychological and neurological studies to determine at what 
age someone can truly make informed consent to or refusal of treatment.  
Part V of this paper will then argue that there should be a rebuttable presumption that an 
adolescent minor should be able to consent to and refuse to treatment, just as a competent adult 
can. Part VI of the paper summarizes and concludes the paper.  
PART II: The Law Governing Treatment Consent and Refusal Laws for Minors 
In the United States, physicians and treating health care professionals have a duty to 
disclose all information to competent patients or their authorized surrogates and obtain informed 
consent. This practice is rooted in the respect for and deference to an individual’s autonomy4 and 
self-determination.  While important exceptions exist,
5
 the law vests the authority to make 
decisions about children’s health care in their parents.6  Unlike competent adult patients, minors 
are not always given the benefit of this deference to individual autonomy. Jurisdictions differ on 
how much weight to give the decision of a minor. Some jurisdictions provide great deference to 
the choices of a minor while others provide none at all.
7
 Minors are presumed incompetent. They 
cannot give informed consent or refuse to consent to treatment. Instead their medical decisions 
                                                          
4
 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”) 
5
  These exceptions include emancipated minors, mature minors, decisions regarding reproductive health, and 
emergency care. See discussion infra, pp. 4-8. 
6
  The Supreme Court has held that parents have a constitutional right to rear their child as they see fit. See 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). 
7
 See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2994-e (McKinney 2010); Compare with In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 
N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (refusing to adopt a mature minor exception for refusal of medical treatment.) 
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are made by a surrogate, typically a parent.
8
 The United States has a long history of treating 
minors as incompetent to consent too many medical decisions. Frequently, the law treats minors 
as incapable of mature decision making.
9
 In Belotti v. Baird, Supreme Court reasoned that  
states validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the 
making of important affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences [because] 
during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the 
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be 
detrimental to them.
10
  
 
Despite that reasoning, the court there held that law which required parental notification 
unconstitutionally burdened the right of the pregnant teenager to have an abortion.
11
 
 
 Within the United States, the right for children to consent to or refuse medical treatment 
is limited in some instances. The right to control one’s body and mind is a fundamental right 
protected by the constitutional protections of the Due Process Clause.
12
 In contrast, the Supreme 
Court has continuously held that parents have a constitutional right to childrearing without 
government interference unless the child is at risk and the state must interfere to protect the 
child.
13
  The law seems to weigh the parents’ constitutional rights in parenting their children over 
children’s rights to privacy. A child’s right to privacy is not as broad as the adult counterpart. 
Indeed a parents’ right to care for their children will often override the child’s right to privacy.14 
Children lose much of their rights when in the care of others, such as their parents or their 
                                                          
8
 See Rosebush v. Oakland Cnty. Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 
584, 603 (1979). 
9
 See generally, Gary B. Melton, Toward “Personhood” for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values in Public 
Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983). 
10
  See Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 623 (1979). 
11
 Id. at 625 
12
 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905); See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,164 (1973). 
13
 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). 
14
 Richard C. Boldt, Adolescent Decision Making: Legal Issues with Respect to Treatment for Substance Misuse and 
Mental Illness, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L.& POL’Y 75, 79-81 (2012)(citing Lawrence Schlam & Joseph P. Wood, 
Informed Consent to the Medical Treatment of Minors: Law and Practice, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 147-49 (2000)). 
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schools.
15
 However, children do have some of the same rights of privacy as adults. As such, with 
some exceptions, the law generally views that minors are less competent than adults and are 
therefore less capable of making the same decisions.
16
  
A. Exceptions to the Rule 
There are several exceptions to the rule that a minor cannot consent to treatment. Some 
examples are specific condition exceptions. These exceptions are statutory exceptions to the 
presumption that minors are incompetent for specific conditions and treatments. Most of these 
statutes relate to abortions, treatment/testing for STD’s and birth control and treatment for 
substance abuse.  For abortion, some states rely on the mature minor doctrine, discussed more 
fully in Part III.  A showing of maturity to a judge in these states will allow a minor to obtain an 
abortion without consent of the parent.
17
  Other states permit minor children to get abortions at 
the age of sixteen without parental consent.  
 Additionally, many states allow for minors to consent for testing and treatment of STD’s 
without consent of a parent. The state’s health and safety concerns in preventing the spread of 
sexually transmitted diseases weighs heavily in allowing these minors to obtain testing and 
treatment without consent.
18
 Likewise, many states allow minors to obtain birth control without 
parental consent. Again, the state’s interest in minors obtaining birth control if they will be 
engaging in sexual conduct militates in favor of allowing minors to obtain birth control without 
                                                          
15
 N.J. v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). 
16
 Generally, the courts recognize adolescents ability to make decisions regarding reproductive rights as the same as 
adults. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977). 
17
 See Id. at 647-48; See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 
(1992). 
18
 Grisso, supra note 3, at 413-416. 
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consent.
19
 The specific condition exceptions are very limited, however. They apply solely to the 
condition for which they were statutorily created and do not extend to other treatments.  
 The second exception which allows treatment for a minor without parental consent is the 
emergency treatment exception. The emergency doctrine is one of the oldest exceptions to 
requiring parental consent for medical treatment.  Under the emergency doctrine, a doctor has a 
right to treat a minor in an emergency without parental consent, because consent is presumed.
20
 
However, the emergency doctrine does not allow a minor to refuse that same medical treatment 
without parental consent.
21
 The emergency doctrine does not give a minor autonomy so much as 
it protects a doctor from committing assault and battery when providing emergency care to a 
minor. 
22
 
 Additionally, many states have status exceptions allowing minors’ consent to medical 
treatment. There are typically three different statuses that allow for a minor to consent to medical 
treatment. The first is a minor is or was previously married. Consent to medical treatment or 
refuse medical treatment in the same manner in which an adult could consent to medical 
treatment or refuse medical treatment. 
23
 Likewise, a second status is for minors who are parents 
themselves. A minor who is a parent can also consent to medical treatment or refuse medical 
treatment for herself or her child.
24
  The third status exception is for minors who have become 
emancipated. An emancipated minor is typically defined as a minor who has received a court 
order of emancipation from her parents.
25
 Some jurisdictions, however, also provide an 
                                                          
19
 Id. at 420. 
20
 See Jackovach v. Yocom, 237 N.W. 444, 448 (Iowa 1931). 
21
 In re Thomas B., 574 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660—61 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991) (holding that the court was justified in 
overruling a fifteen year old’s “vigorous objection” to surgery because it was in his best interests). 
22
 Derry Ridgeway, Innocent of Empirical Rigor, 14 ST. THOMAS L.REV. 165, 188-90 (2001). 
23
 Id. at 195. 
24
 Id. at 169. 
25
 See e.g., N. M. STAT. ANN., § 32A-21-7 (1995). 
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emancipation status exception where the minor has been living independently from their 
parents.
26
 Where a minor is sufficiently emancipated from her parents, she can make medical 
decisions for herself. 
27
  
Because they are presumed incompetent, minors who do not fall into one of the above 
exceptions cannot make their own medical decisions whether they are general decisions or 
decisions regarding life-saving or life sustaining treatment.  Despite this, courts will take 
consideration of a minor’s wishes into account when considering whether to continue or remove 
life sustaining treatment.  The Maine Supreme Court in In re Swan allowed for the refusal of a 
feeding tube for a 17 1/3 year old PVS patient who had clearly indicated prior to that that he 
would not want to live like that. The Court invoked a clear and convincing evidence standard of 
the patient’s wishes. The Maine Supreme Court said that the age of the patient would only be a 
factor in that decision and would not be solely dispositive.
28
  However, in In re  Swan, the 
parents were, in their capacity as co-guardians, seeking a declaratory judgment to terminate 
treatment.  
Likewise, the court in In re Myers permitted the removal of a feeding tube presumably 
from a minor.
29
 Myers had previously had indicated that she did not want to be on a feeding tube. 
Her parents disagreed over the removal of the feeding tube. Her father and step mother, the 
guardian ad litem and her doctors all agreed removing tube was the best. The court applied a best 
interest standard. Myer’s wishes were not dispositive but instead were only one factor in the 
                                                          
26
 See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2994-e (McKinney 2010). 
27
 See Smith v. Seibly, 431 P.2d 719, 723 (Wash. 1967); Ison v. Florida Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 302 So. 2d 
200, 201-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). 
28
 In re Chad Eric Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (“[a] minor acquires capacity to consent to different kinds 
of invasions and conduct at different stages of his development. Capacity exists when the minor has the ability of the 
average person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits.” (quoting PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 18, at 
115 (5th ed. 1984).). 
29
In re Guardianship of Myers, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 763, (Ohio Ct C.P.1993).  
8 
 
decision.
30
 Again, like Swan, the all the parties involved agreed that removing the tube was for 
the best. The court was not faced with conflict between doctors and parents, or parents and the 
patient.  
Additionally, in In Re E.G., the court held that a 17 year old Jehovah’s Witness had a 
common law right to refuse treatment. In that case, the adolescent boy refused blood treatments 
for his Leukemia. His parents agreed with his decision. The state charged his parents with 
neglect. The court performed a balancing test. Again, here the court was not dealing with a 
conflict between the patient and his parents. However, the court also said that if his parents had 
refused to acquiesce to his refusal that the court should defer to the parent’s interests. 31 On the 
other hand, in a case with an adolescent male, an Oregon court held that the wishes of the minor 
did not matter for purposes of refusal of treatment and permitted homicide charges to be brought 
against the parents.
32
 
 The current statutory law and case law throughout the United States for the most 
part leave adolescent minors without autonomy in their medical decisions and without a right to 
consent to or refuse life sustaining medical treatment. While there are exceptions to the rule, for 
the most part, minors have no right to refuse life sustaining treatment. Consent, on the other 
hand, does have more exceptions and more ability for minors to make their own autonomous 
decisions. 
B. The Doctrine of the “Mature Minor” 
Some states have adopted a mature minor, either by statute or within the common law, to 
solve the problems created by conflicting interests of parents, minors and the state in allowing 
                                                          
30
 Id. 
31
  In re E.G., 133 Ill.2d 98, 112 (Ill. 1989). 
32
 State v. Beagley, 305 P.3d 147, 153-55 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). 
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consent or refusal of treatment while other states have adopted mature minor exceptions within 
their common law. Mature Minor Statutes allow a minor to consent to a medical decision if the 
minor can prove competency to consent. The physician, or in some cases the court, makes a 
determination on whether the minor sufficiently understands the consequences of the medical 
decisions.
33
  
Two different types of mature minor exceptions exist: statutory mature minor exceptions 
and common law mature minor exceptions. A minor statute is a statute in which a minor is 
presumed to be competent to consent to medical decisions once they reach a certain age.
34
 These 
statutes essentially allow minors who have reached a certain age to be treated as adults when 
consenting to medical treatment. However, most presumed mature minor statutes do not carve 
out an exception for refusal of treatment.
35
 Because most presumed mature minor statutes do not 
carve out an exception for the refusal of treatment, in those states which have enacted these 
statutes, a minor may be left in a position where they can consent to beginning a treatment but 
will be unable to stop that same treatment.
36
  
While some states have implemented statutory mature minor exceptions, other states rely 
on the common law. The common law exceptions allow a minor to overcome the presumption of 
incompetence but the burden of shifting the presumption stays on the minor. Some states have 
essentially codified the common law mature minor doctrine with mature minor statutes.  A 
showing of maturity to a judge will enable a minor to obtain medical treatment without consent 
                                                          
33
 See Younts v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 337-38 (Kan. 1970); Gulf & S.I.R. Co. 
v. Sullivan, 119 So. 501, 502 (Miss. 1928) 
34
 See,e.g., N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2994-e (McKinney 2010). 
35
  See In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (refusing to adopt a mature minor 
exception for refusal of medical treatment); See also, Beagley, 305 P.3d at 153-157 (holding that the Oregon statute 
allowing minors over the age of 15 the right to consent to medical care did grant 16-year-old the right to refuse 
medical care). 
36
 Beagley, 305 P.3d at 159. 
10 
 
of a parent. Like the presumed mature minor doctrine, these exceptions typically only apply to 
consent to treatment not refusal of treatment.
37
 For the most part, it leaves minors without a 
reliable mechanism to refuse treatment.  
Both mature minor statutes and the mature minor exceptions in state common law are 
inadequate to solve the problems created by conflicting interests in the refusal of life sustaining 
or life saving treatment. Because many mature minor exceptions do not apply to refusal of 
treatment, they instead focus mainly on the consent to treatment. A minor’s interest in the ability 
to consent to treatment is already protected by the state’s interest in the protection of children 
and the state’s interest in life. As such, the mature minor statutes that apply solely to consent for 
treatment do not address any of the problems created by conflicting interest. Additionally, those 
statutes that do apply to refusal of treatment place the burden on the minor to overcome the 
presumption of incompetence. The minor is placed in a position where it is much more difficult 
to have their interests in bodily integrity and privacy respected. For instance, in Cardwell v. 
Bechtol, a judge held that a seventeen year old was not mature enough to consent to a do not 
resuscitate order. Despite the fact that in less than a year, that same minor could consent to a do 
not resuscitate order, the court would not permit it. Discussed more completely below, the 
difference in cognitive ability between a seventeen year old and an eighteen year old is 
negligible.
38
 A seventeen year old is just as competent to make an informed decision.
39
  
                                                          
37
 Id. 
38
 See Grisso, supra note 3, at 412 
39
 Id. 
11 
 
Other states have not adopted mature minor exceptions.
40
 Some courts reason that if a 
legislature has not adopted an explicit mature minor exception, there is no room for exceptions to 
age of majority statutes.
41
Additionally, presumed Mature Minor exceptions that do not include a 
refusal of treatment provision also do not solve the issue.
42
 While the presumption of 
competence allows for the minor to consent, without the statutory explicit presumption of 
competence for refusal of treatment, minors are left without a valid avenue to protect their rights 
and interests.  
PART III: Conflicting Interests of the Adolescent Minor, the Parent and the State 
Whether an adolescent minor should have autonomy and a right to consent or refuse 
medical treatment depends greatly on what the interests of the minor, the parent and the state 
respectively are and if those interests conflict. 
A. The Interests of an Adolescent Minor in their Medical Treatment 
 First and foremost, the adolescent minor has two primary interests in the right to consent 
or refuse to treatment: bodily integrity or autonomy and the right to privacy.
43
 Like an adult, an 
adolescent minor has an interest in bodily integrity. For adults, the Supreme Court has held that  
“no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of 
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”44 While they may 
not have the same rights and protections to possession and control of their body, adolescent 
                                                          
40
 See Novak v. Cobb County Hospital Authority, 849 F. Supp. 1559, 1575-1576 (D. Ga. 1994) (holding that the 
exceptions for consent to medical treatment for minors to abortion, substance abuse, STD treatment did not permit a 
mature minor exception). 
41
 See, e.g.,Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1154-1156 (Pa. 2000) (holding that had the legislature 
intended a mature minor exception it would have included one in the statute). 
42
 See infra note 28. 
43
  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 274 (1990). 
44
 Id. at 269 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). 
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minors still have an interest in that possession and control of their body.
45
 Adolescents are in the 
stage between childhood and adulthood. Personhood and self-determination become a large part 
of who an adolescent is.
46
 As adolescents go through the changes of puberty and their changing 
body, their interests in their body, their privacy, and their autonomy continue to grow.
47
 
Additionally, while minors do not have the same rights to privacy, they have an interest in 
privacy. The Supreme Court has consistently held the importance of privacy in an adult’s 
decision making for medical procedures.
48
 While courts have not extended all of those rights to 
minors, some courts have used the right to privacy to support an incompetent individual’s ability 
to refuse treatment through a surrogate.
49
 While there are many differences between a previously 
competent but currently incompetent person and a minor who is always presumed competent, the 
incompetent individual still has an interest in their privacy. Thus it is clear that even if 
incompetent, minors maintain an interest in their privacy and their bodily integrity and those 
interests should be taken into account along with the health of a child. 
B. Parental and State Interests in Medical Treatment of an Adolescent Minor 
When dealing with a minor patient, the parent’s interests must also be examined. A 
parent has two main interests: their right to raise their child as they see fit
50
 and their 
responsibility for their child. As discussed, the Supreme Court consistently holds that a parent 
has a constitutional right to raise a child without government interference except in the most 
                                                          
45
 John Eekelaar, The Emergence of Children's Rights, 6 O.J.L.S. 161, 170-71 (1986) (noting that autonomy interests 
can be important to children). 
46
 Id.  
47
 Ridgeway, supra note 22, at 188-90. 
48
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,127 (1973). 
49
 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985). 
50
 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). 
13 
 
extreme cases.
51
 Because parents have an interest in their child’s life and upbringing, they have 
an interest in deciding the medical treatment which their child should receive. In addition to that, 
parents also have a duty to provide care to their child. Thus, their interest in medical care for 
their child stems from the legal obligations they maintain for their child. Legally, a parent is 
responsible for the wellbeing of their child. Neglect and abuse statutes exist to protect children 
and hold parents accountable for that responsibility. 
Finally, the state has its own interests in the medical treatment for children. The doctrine 
of parents patriae, or parent of the nation, comes into play.
52
  The state steps into the role of 
caretaker for children or other incompetent individuals to protect them. Traditionally the state 
has five main interests: the protection of children, interest in life, interest in suicide prevention, 
interest in third parties and interest in the sanctity of the medical profession.
53
  
C. When Interests Conflict 
The interests of the state, minor child and the parents sometimes conflict. When the 
interests of these parties conflict, the courts are left to solve the problems that may arise. The 
primary question the courts must consider is whose interests should be considered and whose 
interests are most important. With the treatment of adults, the decision is easier. Their interest in 
the right to privacy, self determination, bodily integrity and informed consent generally outweigh 
the state’s interest and allow for competent adults to refuse medical treatment.54 On the other 
hand, with minors, the balancing of interests becomes much more difficult. First of all, there are 
more interests and more parties involved. For the most part, case law dealing with consent to 
treatment or refusal of treatment for minors involves situations where the parents and the minor 
                                                          
51
 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. 
52
 Ridgeway, supra note 22, at 197-200. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,274 (1990). 
14 
 
agree on the course of treatment.
55
 In two cases, however, the parents and child did disagree as to 
treatment path.
56
  In In re Hudson, a minor sought to consent to treatment and her parent refused, 
the state followed the parent’s wishes. Likewise in In re Thomas B, where a child wished to 
refuse treatment and the parent consented to treatment, the state again followed the wishes of the 
parent, weighing the interests in favor of the parent’s decision.57In that situation, the minor is left 
without a mechanism for their interests when there is a conflict between themselves and their 
parents.  
One example of where parental interests can conflict with the interest of the minor is 
donor siblings. When a parent seeks to consent to an organ, or bone marrow donation for one 
sibling to another sibling, the parent’s interests are clearly in conflict with the interest of the 
child.
58
 This example has made more prevalent with the rise of assisted reproductive technology 
and the creation of “designer babies” or “spare parts babies”.59 In these situations, parents use 
assisted reproductive technology and genetic testing to create genetic matches to children who 
are already sick. In situations such as these, the interests of the one child may be being sacrificed 
for the interest of the other child.
60
 Indeed, the conflicts raised in these scenarios have even been 
popularized in modern fiction.
61
 In these scenarios, courts must respect autonomous rights of the 
                                                          
55
 Ridgeway, supra note 22, at 185-187. 
56
See In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 767-68 (Wash. 1942) (en banc). 
57
 See In re Thomas B., 574 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (Fam. Ct. 1991). 
58
 Ridgeway, supra note 22, at 188-190.  
59
 Stephen L. Baird, Designer Babies: Eugenics Repackaged, BIOTECHNOLOGY/MED. 28, 30-35 (2012). 
60
 See Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 388-390 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972)(comparing the interests of the a ten month old 
twin in donating a kidney to his brother with those of his parents); See also, Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 494-
495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)(discussing the appointment of a guardian ad litem to determine interests of a fourteen 
year old potential donor with Down Syndrome). 
61
 See generally, JODI PICCOULT, MY SISTER’S KEEPER, Simon & Schuster, 2004. (examining the conflicts caused by 
reliance on one sibling for donation materials for a sick sibling as well as the problems created when a chronically ill 
minor wishes to cease treatment.) 
15 
 
child donor and appoint a guardian ad litem for the potential donor.
62
  Even with the court’s 
response to the conflict of interest, it is clear that the interests of children and parents, at times, 
can and do conflict. 
 Additionally, problems arise when physicians and parents disagree over 
treatment. Where a minor and physician agree in removal of treatment but a parent disagrees, 
conflicts over treatment are likely to arise. Because of the permanency involved with ending life 
sustaining treatment, the conflicts are likely to continue and grow. Typically when a parent and a 
physician disagree over treatment, the issue will go to a court.
63
 Courts will also intervene when 
parents cannot agree on a course of treatment.
64
  Physicians also run into issues with forcing 
treatment on an adolescent minor who does not consent to treatment.
65
 
 While currently, less focus is given to the minor’s interests, for adolescent minors, their 
interests should be weighed more heavily. Their age and maturity should be taken into 
consideration when weighing their interests, especially where their interests are competing 
against the state and their parents’ interest.  Minors should have a mechanism to protect their 
interests in the event that they disagree with their parents. 
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PART IV: Adolescent Minors’ Cognitive Ability to Consent to or Refuse Treatment 
 
 The presumption that minors are incompetent is grounded in the idea that minors and 
adults have different levels of cognitive functioning and psychological abilities. This premise is 
flawed. While minors under the age of 11 have limited ability to consent to treatment, there is no 
psychological reason why minors aged 15 and above cannot provide meaningful consent.
66
 In 
Minors’ Consent to Treatment: a Developmental Perspective, Grasso and Vierling discuss that 
the law should look to adolescents’ actual capabilities, “lest in our zeal we burden some minors 
with decisions that they cannot make intelligently (sometimes to their detriment) or inadvertently 
deny to some the opportunity to make decisions of which they are fully capable."
67
  
A. What is Consent? 
Psychology recognizes three types of consent for minors making medical decisions: 
consent independent of parental consent, dissent to treatment, and right to know and participate 
in consent discussions.
68
 Under the first type of consent, some physicians argue that classes of 
minors should be allowed to consent to and refuse treatment independent from their parents.
69
 
This type of consent can already be seen through current law in the consent allowances for 
abortion, psychiatric treatment, STD treatment and substance abuse.
70
 Additionally, some states 
allow for classes of minors based on age, to consent to any treatment as a whole.
71
  
Under the second type of consent, physicians argue that minors by law, and as an ethical 
principal, should be allowed to dissent to treatment for which their parents have consented. The 
idea is that a patient should not be treated against their will. One example of this type of consent 
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can be seen through psychiatric holds. The Supreme Court has held that while a parent has the 
right to have their child placed in psychiatric care against their will, children have a due process 
right to have those holds reviewed if they are against treatment.
72
  Another example is seen 
through a minor’s right to refuse an abortion. Courts have held that a minor has a right to dissent 
from a therapeutic abortion to which the minor’s parent has already consented.73 This theory of 
consent raises both ethical and legal issues. First, there is a question whether physicians have or 
should have an ethical obligation not to perform procedures on minors who dissent from 
treatment.
74
 Second, the legal question is raised, should minors have a legal right to dissent.
75
 
There is growing support from physicians for allowing dissent for minors, especially where the 
treatment is nonessential or the benefits are questionable.
76
 The support can greatly been seen in 
the field of medical research where the benefits of using subjects who assent, as opposed to 
dissent, are seen.
77
 
Both the first and second type of consent implicates the legal rights that minors have or 
should have. As such, both independent consent and dissent to treatment both implicate the 
capacity of minors to consent to treatment. On the other hand, the third type is not a legal consent 
issue but instead reflects solely physicians’ ethical obligations to inform patients, including 
minors, of the treatment options and allow them to at least participate in the conversation.
78
 
Physicians argue that to whatever extent possible minors should be permitted to take an active 
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part in evaluating options, even without the capacity to grant or withhold consent.
79
 The third 
type of consent, however, does not include any legal rights and thus no implications of a child’s 
capacity to consent.  
A minor’s capacity for meaningful consent must first turn on the definition of consent. 
Typically consent must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
80
 A child may have a different 
capacity for making knowing consent versus intelligent consent versus voluntary consent. As 
such, to determine what capacity a minor has to consent or refuse consent for a medical 
procedure, the cognitive abilities of a minor must be examined for their ability to know and 
understand, make intelligent decisions and make voluntary decisions.
81
 
B. A Minor’s Capacity for “Knowing” 
Knowledge is the first aspect of consent. “Knowing can be interpreted as one's 
understanding of the semantic content of the information that is provided by the professional. 
That is the patient knows if he/she understands the consensual meanings of the words and 
phrases of the message”82 In order to determine a minor’s capacity for knowledge, the 
developmental progress of a minor should be examined. Development can hinder knowledge and 
thus the capacity to consent.
83
 With regard to medical terminology, it is unclear exactly how 
much minors can understand when receiving the information. However, likewise, adults not 
trained in the medical field, also may have the same lack of understanding. As such, physicians 
can be tasked with informing minors the same way they would inform adults. The doctrine of 
informed consent solves the issues created by a lack of underlying knowledge of the medical 
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terminology. While some terminology may be hard for a minor to learn,
84
 a system, such as a 
patient synthesizing what they have been told and repeating it back to the doctor, can be 
implemented by doctors to ensure that decisions are truly being made knowingly.  
C. A Minor’s Capacity for Intelligent Consent 
In addition to the requirement that consent be knowing, consent must be given 
intelligently.  Psychologically intelligent decisions are those decisions which are made rationally. 
Intelligence and the ability to make rational decision are tied to child development. The stage at 
which rational decisions are made is called Formal Operations. Several researchers have noted 
that minors who are aged 11-13, typically have reached the formal operations stage.
85
 Not all 
minors aged 11-13 will enter formal operations by that time and as such not all minors will have 
rational thought by that time. However, research shows that some adults never reach formal 
operations. Despite this there is  
some evidence that around 12, a substantial percentage of minors have attained a 
stage of cognitive development (formal operations) that predominates in the 
general adult population. Thus there may be no clear rational for denying minors 
over 12 (as a group the privilege of independent consent or veto of parental 
consent solely on the basis of intellectual capacity.
86
 
It is clear that psychological evidence supports the idea that minors aged 12 an over can 
make an intelligent decision regarding consent of treatment. 
 In contrast with the psychological studies that minors aged 12 and over can make 
intelligent rational decisions, some neurological studies show that because of an 
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underdeveloped prefrontal cortex, minors are more likely to make impulsive decisions.
87
 
These studies show that minors are less likely to carefully consider the implications of the 
decisions they make and may not even have the ability to view decisions in the far 
future.
88
 However, even if the neurological deficits do exist, the less developed prefrontal 
cortex does not prevent minors from being held accountable from other long term 
decisions. Indeed, an adolescent minor may be charged as an adult for crimes they make 
despite of the alleged increase in impulsivity.
89
 
 D. A Minor’s Capacity for Voluntary Consent 
 Even after determining that minors around age 12 can make an intelligent consent 
decision, that decision must still be voluntary. The voluntariness of consent decisions for 
minors brings in the issues of social externalities.
90
 Studies show that minors have a less 
developed pre-frontal cortex which leads to decisions that are more influenced by how 
they will be perceived socially.
91
 Studies have shown that when asked to respond to 
questions gauging whether it is a good plan to do dangerous activities, such as swimming 
with sharks, adolescent minors neurological activity showed that the regions gauging 
social response were triggered where the adult neurological activity showed fear signals.
92
 
Adolescents are more likely to make decision based on social pressures. Indeed, the 
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externality of young adolescents, around age 13, is more similar to that of 9-10 year olds 
than to adolescents ranged 15-16.
93
 
 On the other hand, the psychological studies of Jesness and Loveinger and Wessler 
show that there are developmental levels in children with regard to social interaction. The 
systems contain developmental levels with high conformity as well as categories with 
negative and oppositional responses to social demands.
94
  High conformity stages would 
make minors more likely to acquiesce and provide involuntary consent. The oppositional 
stages would have the opposite effect and likely cause unwillful dissent by minors. 
Loveninger and Wessler showed that 87% of their sample of 12 years old function at or 
below the conformity stage, compared with only 55% of 14 year olds and 10% of 17 year 
olds.
95
 Thus minors in their preadolescent years are most likely to have deferent responses 
to authority and make involuntary consent decisions.
96
 That level remains high in the early 
adolescent years and is augmented by an increased concern for social expectations. The 
risk for deferent responses remains high through the age of 15. Minors aged 15 and above 
can typically manifest voluntary consent.
97
 
  Thus psychological and neurological studies seem to support the contention that 
there is no reason to disallow a minor over the age of 15 from consenting to or refusing 
medical treatments independently of their parents. Additionally, the studies support the 
contention that children under the age of 11 should not be able to consent to or refuse 
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treatment because of their underdeveloped cognitive functions. Finally, the studies support 
the idea that children 11-14 may be able to cognitively provide knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary consent to medical treatments in certain circumstances. 
PART VI: Expansion of Adolescents’ Rights to Consent through Expanded Presumed 
Mature Minor Exceptions 
In order to solve the conflicts created by the competing interests of minor patients’, their 
parents, and the state, the legislature should expand an adolescent minor’s right to consent to or 
refuse medical treatment. Specifically, there should be rebuttable presumption that an adolescent 
minor is competent to consent to or refuse medical treatment also known as a presumed mature 
minor law.  A well crafted rebuttable presumption would give adolescents the autonomy that 
they deserve, especially when dealing with the prospect of the end of life. The presumption 
would be rebuttable with clear and convincing evidence that the minor is incompetent (either 
from mental illness, including severe depression, or from lack of understanding about the 
consequences of refusal of treatment.) The rebuttable presumption would place the burden on 
those with more power in the system, the doctor or the parent as opposed to the individual with 
the least amount of power in the system, the minor. 
Presumptive mature minor statutes already function and are successful in several states 
regarding consent for treatment. Extending those statutes to refusal of treatment would solve the 
conflicting interests of the parents of minors, minors themselves and the state.  As discussed, 
there is no psychological reason why a minor over the age of 15 should not be permitted to 
consent to or refuse treatment and minors aged 13-14 may be able to make competent decisions. 
While it is true that not all adolescents are intellectually capable of providing independent 
consent, the same could be said for the adult population. Despite that, with adolescents there is a 
23 
 
presumption of incompetence that must be overcome with a showing of maturity while adults 
receive the opposite: a presumption that they are competent that can be overcome by a showing 
of incompetence. Allowing adolescent minors the same presumption, would respect the decision 
making cognitive and psychological abilities of minors as well while providing a mechanism to 
rebut the presumption for those adolescent minors who are truly incapable of making these 
important decisions. 
Adolescents have the understanding to make decisions regarding life sustaining 
treatments or life saving treatment.
98
 Studies show that adolescents can and should be given 
autonomy over their own medical decisions. Furthermore, the rebuttable presumption is 
supported by the mental capacity of adolescents. By making the presumption a rebuttable 
presumption, the statute would also leave room for the possibility that not all adolescents are 
created the same. Essentially, the rebuttable presumption would treat adolescent minors as adults 
for the purposes of consenting to or refusing medical treatment. The presumption would leave 
the opportunity of rebuttal with evidence of incompetence.  
The rebuttable presumption shifts the burden to the state, physicians, or parents to prove a 
minor’s incompetence. By placing burden on the party contesting competence, the presumption 
forces those individuals with more resources (the state, the parents, and the doctors) to sustain 
the burden. When examining court proceedings between physicians and parents, it is clear that 
physicians and hospitals are more likely to have the resources to go to court quickly and 
efficiently.
99
 If parents of minors can lack the resource to fight the physicians and hospitals, how 
can the courts expect a minor to sustain the resources to prove their own competence? Instead, 
the minors should be given the benefit of the presumption of competence. Even the most mature 
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minor, without any resources, may struggle to show competence. It also encourages conversation 
between parties by providing the minor with more bargaining power. In the current system, 
because it is so difficult for a minor to make a decision regarding their end of life care, a minor 
has no way to assert their view point. By providing the minor a better position, they can more 
easily try and make their own decisions regarding life sustaining treatment. 
 A presumptive mature minor exception would not discourage a minor from making their 
own medical decisions. A presumption in favor of a minor would prevent that minor from having 
to try and find a way to proceed in court to gain rights to their own body. The presumptive 
statute recognizes that there is a difference between the maturity to make a medical decision and 
the resources and ability to involve oneself in a court proceeding.  The presumption would give 
many more minors an easier opportunity to make their own medical decisions. A minor who 
more involved in the decision is making process for their treatment is more likely to succeed in 
that treatment if it is taken. 
 The rebuttable presumption of competence will further act as a safeguard for those 
adolescents who truly should not be making a decision or for those who are suffering from 
depression or other mental illness at the time. By permitting the presumption to be rebutted, the 
proposed statute would still support the interests of the parents and the state. The parent’s interest 
in parenting their children would be supported by their ability to go to court and prove their child 
is not mature enough to make the medical decision. Furthermore, a parent would be protected 
from prosecution under neglect and abuse statutes if their child was responsible for their own 
decisions. Finally, the state’s interest in protection of children and life can be fulfilled in the 
cases where it is necessary through the rebuttable presumption. Finally, a rebuttable mature 
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minor presumption allows for the legal system to be avoided in cases where there is no debate 
between the parents and the minor.   
PART VI: Conclusion 
 Because of the problems created in the current system through the conflicting interests of 
the parents, minors and states in refusal of life sustaining treatment by minors, a presumptive 
rebuttable mature minor statute should be implemented in the United States. This rebuttable 
presumptive statute would provide the autonomy for adolescent minors while protecting a 
parent’s interests in the life of their child and the states interests in protecting children. Currently 
in the United States, the law does not adequately protect the interests of adolescent minors.  
Judicial decisions are varied and the law is a mismatched patchwork of different rules. While 
physicians generally cannot ethically perform procedures on a patient who is on willing, 
adolescent minors are still left without a legal mechanism to protect their rights. 
 Psychology is clear in that there is no reason an adolescent minor aged 15 or older should 
be unable to consent to or refuse treatment independent of their parents. Furthermore, adolescent 
minors aged 13-14 are also capable of consent, albeit more inconsistently than those a year or 
two older. These adolescent minors have the capacity to consent and they have a growing interest 
in their personal autonomy and self determination as well as the privacy of their body. While the 
rights of a minor to privacy and autonomy are limited, their interest is ever growing in 
adolescence. As such, because the cognitive abilities to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
consent are there, the legislatures should adopt a rebuttable presumption which views all 
adolescent minors aged 14 or higher as able to consent to or refuse medical treatment. 
 
